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relevancy appears to overrule many of the post-1950 decisions.
For the first time in Louisiana, it has been expressly recognized
that the trial court has the duty to exclude even relevant evi-
dence if its probative value does not justify its prejudicial effect.
Secondly, the supreme court recognizes the constitutional prob-
lems inherent in the use of other crimes evidence, and adopts
comprehensive procedures to protect the defendant from unwar-
ranted character attack.
William A. Jones, Jr.
OTHER CRIMES EVIDENCE IN LOUISIANA-
II. TO ATTACK THE CREDIBILITY OF THE
DEFENDANT ON CROSS-EXAMINATION
In Louisiana, when a defendant in a criminal trial chooses
to testify in his own behalf, he may be cross-examined as any
other witness.' The state may, by certain approved methods,
then seek to persuade the jury to disregard his testimony by
supreme court affirmed a murder conviction in which the state had been al-
lowed to introduce evidence of a rape committed four years prior to the crime
In question. In a 5-2 decision (two justices concurring), the majority affirmed
the conviction because the defendant was charged with felony-murder; thus
the prior rape was admissible to prove defendant's intent and system to
commit the felony of rape, during which the death occurred. The two
concurring opinions expressly adhered to Prieur and appeared to severely
limit the majority's holding. The two dissenting justices stated that the
evidence was cumulative, irrelevant, and highly prejudicial and thus should
have been excluded under the holding of Prieur. The facts of the case and
a fair reading of the concurring and dissenting opinions lead the writer to
believe that the Frezal holding will be limited to its facts and that the
dominant judicial attitude, and thus the viable authority in future cases, is
expressed in Prieur and Moore. See also, State v. Jordan, 276 So.2d 277 (La.
1973).
1. LA. R.S. 15:462 (1950) provides: "When a person accused, or a hus-
band or wife becomes a witness, such witness shall be subject to all the
rules that apply to other witnesses, and may be cross-examined upon the
whole case." See United States v. Bland, 432 F.2d 96 (5th Cir. 1970); State v.
Cripps, 259 La. 403, 250 So.2d 382 (1971); State v. Guillory, 201 La. 52, 9 So.2d
450 (1942); State v. Dreher, 166 La. 924, 118 So. 85, cert. denied, 278 U.S. 641
(1928); State v. Toliver, 163 La. 1000, 113 So. 222 (1927); State v. Waldron,
128 La. 559, 54 So. 1009 (1911); State v. Guy, 106 La. 8, 30 So. 268 (1901);
State v. Murphy, 45 La. Ann. 958, 13 So. 229 (1893). For a discussion of the
general rule elsewhere, see 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 980 (Chadbourne rev.
1970) [hereinafter cited as WIOMORE]; and C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 132, at
278-79 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK]: "[W]hen an accused
testifies he becomes liable to cross-examination under whatever rules would
be applicable to any other witness, and by testifying he waives his privilege
to that extent. Not only may he be questioned concerning all facts relevant
to the matters he has testified to on direct examination but he is also
subject to a searching cross-examination for impeachment purposes."
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attacking his credibility.2 One method by which this attack
may be accomplished is to elicit discrediting testimony from
the witness himself on cross-examination. When a defendant is
cross-examined as to his prior convictions or other acts of mis-
conduct, the chances of prejudice are greater than when the
ordinary witness is subject to the same inquiry. Thus, the extent
to which discrediting past acts may be the subject of cross-
examination becomes more significant when the defendant is a
witness.3
The purpose of this Comment is to determine to what extent
prior convictions and other acts of misconduct of the defendant
are proper subjects of cross-examination as reflecting upon his
credibility. This discussion will not consider the use of prior acts,
even those sought on cross-examination, in order to prove the
state's case in chief, i.e., the probability of defendant's having
committed the crime charged.4
Prior Convictions
Jurisdictions other than Louisiana
In most states, a witness may be impeached by cross-examina-
tion as to his prior convictions.5 In those jurisdictions there are
In Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), the Supreme Court applied the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination to the states through
the fourteenth amendment. The federal courts follow the "narrow rule" of
cross-examination, limiting waiver to the extent covered on direct and
respecting defendant's credibility. Some states, including Louisiana, follow
the "broad rule" of cross-examination, allowing inquiry on the whole case.
Since the right waived is one guaranteed by the United States Constitution,
it has been suggested that the states are now obliged to use the "narrow
rule" as used in the federal courts. See Tucker v. United States, 5 F.2d 818
(8th Cir. 1925); McCoRMIcK § 132, at 270-80; The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1968-1969 Term-Evidence, 30 LA. L. REv. 321, 328
(1969). Rule 608(b) of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence would provide
that "[t]he giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other
witness, does not operate as a waiver of his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion when examined with respect to matters which relate only to credibility."
2. LA. R.S. 15:486 (1950): "Each side has the right to impeach the testi-
mony and the credibility of every witness sworn on behalf of the other side."
For a summary of the approved methods of impeachment, see McCoRMICK §§
33-50.
3. See text accompanying notes 28-40 infra.
4. LA. R.S. 15:445-46 (1950). These statutes concern the use of other acts
to show knowledge, intent, system, etc. in the state's case in chief, and are
the subject of the accompanying article to this Comment. See Comment, 33
LA. L. REv. 614 (1973).
5. See generally 4B. JONES, EVIDENCE § 26:20 (Gard 6th ed. 1972);
MCCORMICK § 43; 2C. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE §§ 475-77, 481
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multitudinous rules governing the use of this evidence." How-
ever, there exists wide diversity as to the nature of the crimes
that may be used to attack credibility in this manner.7 At least
two jurisdictions8 have adopted the approach taken in the Uni-
form Rules of Evidence, providing that if the conviction does not
involve "dishonesty or false statement," it is inadmissible to
impair a witness' credibility; and, where the witness is the
(13th ed. 1972); Wioaoam §§ 980, 987; Cohen, Impeachment of a Defendant by
Prior Convictions, 6 Cm?. L. Bui.. 26 (1970); Comment, 36 Mo. L. REv. 472
(1971); Note, 71 W. VA. L. Rav. 160 (1969).
6. Included among those rules are: generally, courts have refused to
consider adjudications in juvenile cases as convictions which would be
admissible in evidence for impeachment purposes, People v. Witt, 159 Cal.
App. 2d 492, 324 P.2d 79 (1958); People v. Warren, 23 Mich. App. 20, 178
N.W.2d 127 (1970); Banas v. State, 34 Wis. 2d 468, 149 N.W.2d 571, cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 962 (1967). Neither a pardon, Rush v. State, 253 Ala. 537,
45 So.2d 761 (1950), Annot., 30 A.L.R.2d 893 (1953), nor the pendency of an
appeal, People v. Bey, 42 11. 2d 139, 246 N.E.2d 287 (1969), have prevented
the use of convictions. A conviction too remote in time may not be used
in some states, State v. Loftis, 89 Ariz. 403, 363 P.2d 585 (1961), but in other
jurisdictions, very remote convictions have been allowed, People v. Somer-
ville, 88 Ill. App. 2d 134, 231 N.E.2d 701 (1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 823
(1968), or the admissibility of remote convictions has been left to the dis-
cretion of the trial judge, Lanier v. State, 43 Ala. App. 38, 170 So.2d 167
(1965). To be used in this context, the proceeding must have gone to judg-
ment with a verdict of guilty and a sentence by the court, Austin v. State,
451 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970). A mere verdict of guilty, Common-
wealth v. Finkelstein, 191 Pa. Super. 328, 156 A.2d 888 (1959), or a plea of
guilty, is not sufficient, Curtis v. State, 224 Ga. 870, 165 S.E.2d 150 (1968).
See Note, 28 WASH. & LEE L. Rsv. 490 (1971).
. In most jurisdictions not only the fact of convictions, but also the name,
Cousins v. State, 230 Md. 2, 185 A.2d 488 (1962), the nature of the crime,
People v. Childers, 20 Mich. App. 639, 174 N.W.2d 565 (1969), and the time
and place of conviction, Hadley v. State, 25 Ariz. 23, 212 P. 458 (1923), may
be admitted. But it is not permissible to show the details of the crime,
People v. Howard, 166 Cal. App. 2d 638, 334 P.2d 105 (1959). Further, the
conviction can only be proved by asking the witness himself, or by showing
the record of conviction, People v. Finks, 343 Mich. 304, 72 N.W.2d 250 (1955).
7. Among those crimes permitted are: (1) common law infamous crimes:
People v. Alvis, 342 Ill. 460, 174 N.E. 527 (1930); People v. Hudson, 270
N.E.2d 84 (11. App. 1971); ILL. Rsv. STAT. ch. 38, § 124-1 (1967); (2) felonies
only: State v. Mangrum, 98 Ariz. 279, 403 P.2d 925 (1965); People v. McClellan,
71 Cal. 2d 793, 457 P.2d 871, 80 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1969); (3) felonies and serious
misdemeanors: State v. Jemmess, 143 Me. 380, 62 A.2d 867 (1948); (4) crimes
involving moral turpitude: McGee v. State, 206 Tenn. 230, 332 S.W.2d 507
(1960); Johnson v. State, 453 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970); (5) crimes
involving dishonesty and false statements: Cotton v. Commonwealth, 454
S.W.2d 698 (Ky. App. 1970), noted in 59 Ky. L.J. 514 (1971); (6) any crime:
Johnson v. State, 236 Ark. 917, 370 S.W.2d 610 (1963); (7) trial court discre-
tion: Spaulding v. State, 481 P.2d 389 (Alaska 1971); State v. Marquez, 160
Conn. 47, 273 A.2d 689 (1970); State v. Coca, 80 N.M. 95, 451 P.2d 999 (1969).
8. Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-421 (1964); Virgin Islands, V.I. CoDE ANN.
tit. 5, § 835 (1964).
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accused, no evidence of his prior conviction is admissible unless
he has introduced evidence to support his credibility.9
It appears clear, however, pursuant to the recent United
States Supreme Court decision of Loper v. Beto,'0 that any prior
conviction must be constitutionally valid before it can be used
to impeach a defendant's credibility. Further, at least one state
jurisdiction has declared unconstitutional the use of prior con-
victions against a defendant to impeach."
In the federal courts of appeal, the admissibility of prior
convictions' 2 to impeach also has depended upon the nature of
the crime;13 and, generally, the rules used in the federal courts
have been similar to those governing the state courts.' 4 How-
9. UNFoRM RuLE OF EVIDENcm 21 (1953). To the same effect is MODEL CODE
OF EVIDENCE rule 106 (1942).
10. 405 U.S. 473 (1972).
11. State v. Santiago, 492 P.2d 657 (Hawaii 1971), noted in 25 VANO. L.
REv. 918 (1972). The Hawaii supreme court declared that the admission of
evidence of prior convictions to impeach the credibility of the defendant
denied him his fourteenth amendment right to due process. The court found
that the rule unnecessarily prejudiced defendants with prior convictions
and that it unreasonably burdened the defendant's right to testify in his
own defense.
12. See generally C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 416 (1969);
Orfleld, Impeachment of Witnesses in Federal Criminal Cases, 11 U. KAN.
L. Rxv. 447, 464-70 (1963). For a summary of the recent cases in the federal
courts of appeals, see Note, The United States Courts of Appeals: 1971-72
Term, Crimrnal Law & Procedure--Evidence, 61 GEORGETOWN L.J. 409, 419-22
(1972).
13. Support can be found in the federal cases for the use of each of the
following crimes: (1) any crime: United States v. Cohen, 177 F.2d 523 (2d Cir.
1949); Campbell v. United States, 176 F.2d 45 (D.C. Cir. 1949); (2) felonies
but not misdemeanors: Johnson v. United States, 424 F.2d 537 (9th Cir.
1970); (3) crimes involving moral turpitude: United States v. Griffin, 378
F.2d 445 (6th Cir. 1967); (4) any felony but misdemeanors only if they involve
moral turpitude: United States v. Saitta, 443 F.2d 830 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 938 (1971); United States v. Frazier, 418 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1969);
(5) any crime amounting to crimen falsi: Johnson v. United States, 424
F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1970); (6) only crimes involving dishonest conduct: United
States v. Remco, 388 F.2d 783 (3d Cir. 1968); (7) trial court discretion:
United States v. Williams, 445 F.2d 421 (10th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Vigo, 435 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir. 1970). A leading case in this regard is Luck v.
United States, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965). The author of the opinion dis-
cusses the case and its implications in McGowan, Impeachment of Criminal
Defendants by Prior Convictions, 1970 LAw & SOCIAL ORDER 1. But see Dixon
v. United States, 287 A.2d 89 (D.C. Cir. 1972), noted in 34 U. PITT. L. Rev. 67
(1972), which rejected the Luck decision.
14. Inquiry has been allowed even though an appeal is pending, United
States v. Franicevich, 471 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Allen,
457 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1972); contra, United States v. Semenshohn, 421 F.2d
1206 (2d Cir. 1970), or the witness has received a full pardon, Gurleski v.
United States, 405 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1968); United States v. Denton, 307
F.2d 336 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 923 (1962). But see United States v.
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ever, a significant limitation would be placed on this use of
prior convictions in federal courts by the adoption of rule 609
of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence. That provision
states as the general rule that a prior conviction can be used
to impeach a witness only if the previous crime was punishable
by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, or, if the crime
involved "dishonesty or false statement" regardless of the pun-
ishment.15 The rule also provides certain other safeguards, such
as the imposition of definite time limitations; giving effect to a
pardon, annulment, or certificate of rehabilitation; and a gen-
eral exclusion of juvenile adjudications. However, the pendency
of an appeal from the conviction would not render the evidence
of the conviction inadmissible.
Louisiana
Under R.S. 15:495,16 a cross-examiner 17 in any criminal
McCarthy, 445 F.2d 587 (7th Cir. 1971), which followed the Proposed Federal
Rules of Evidence rule 609(c) as a guideline, and reversed a conviction
because of the use of a prior conviction which had been pardoned. Although
there are no statutes, most courts have held an adjudication of juvenile
delinquency not to be a crime, and thus it cannot be used to impeach,
Jones v. United States, 404 F.2d 212 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Brown v. United
States, 338 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1964). Contrary to most state courts, most
federal courts have allowed inquiry into remote convictions, United States v.
Stroud, 474 F.2d 737 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. DiLorenzo, 429 F.2d
216 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 950 (1970); Gurleski v. United States,
405 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1968). But see United States v. McCarthy, 445 F.2d 587
(7th Cir. 1971), where the court reversed because of the use of a 38-year-old
conviction, citing Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence rule 609(b) as a
guideline.
Under federal practice, to be admissible, the conviction must be called
to the attention of the witness. The cross-examiner may then establish the
number of convictions, the nature of the crime charged, and the date and
time of the conviction, Beaudine v. United States, 368 F.2d 417 (5th Cir.
1966). However, he may not question the witness ab6ut details of the con-
viction, United States v. Mitchell, 427 F.2d 644 (3d Cir. 1970); United States
v. Senior, 274 F.2d 613 (7th Cir. 1960). It has been held that the witness
may rehabilitate himself, subject to trial court control, United States v.
Crisafi, 304 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1962); Wittenburg v. United States, 304 F. Supp.
744 (D. Minn. 1969).
15. Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence rule 609(a). See Glick, Impeach-
ment by Prior Convictions: A Critique of Rule 6-09 of the Proposed Rules
of Evidence for the U.S. District Courts, 6 CGIM. L. BULL. 330 (1970).
16. LA. R.S. 15:495: "Evidence of conviction of crime, but not of arrest,
indictment or prosecution, is admissible for the purpose of impeaching the
credibility of the witness, but before evidence of such former conviction
can be adduced from any other source than the witness whose credibility
is to be impeached, he must have been questioned on cross-examination as
to such conviction, and have failed distinctly to admit same; and no wit-
ness, whether he be defendant or not, can be asked on cross-examination
whether or not he has ever been indicted or arrested, and can only be ques-
tioned as to conviction, and as provided herein."
17. It is clear under the statute that before proof of conviction may be
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trial18 may question a witness about prior convictions to impeach
his credibility. If the witness fails to admit the conviction, then
evidence of it may be adduced from any other source.19 How-
ever, the witness may not properly be asked about any previous
arrest, indictment, or prosecution.20 But, according to recent
Louisiana supreme court decisions, any conviction including mis-
demeanors, 21 regardless of the remoteness in time of the convic-
tion, and whether the conviction directly bears upon the witness'
veracity,22 may be the subject of this inquiry. Additionally, it has
adduced from any other source, the witness must have been questioned as
to the conviction on cross-examination. State v. Scott, 237 La. 71, 110 So.2d
530 (1959); State v. Brown, 185 La. 1023, 171 So. 433 (1936). Accordingly,
it has been held that prospective jurors could not be asked on voir dire
examination whether the use of prior convictions for impeachment purposes
would influence their decision in the case. State v. Harper, 260 La. 715, 257
So.2d 381 (1972). See also State v. Carite, 244 La. 928, 155 So.2d 21 (1963).
18. The statute has also been applied in civil cases. See Fusilier v. Em-
ployer's Ins., 235 So.2d 618 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970); Middleton v. Consolidated
Underwriters, 185 So.2d 307 (La. App. 1st ir. 1966); Jacobs v. Landry, 82
So.2d 481 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1955). See also The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1965-1966 Term-Evdence, 27 LA. L. Rsv. 551, 552
(1967).
19. The record of conviction may be produced as evidence of the prior
conviction. State v. Vastine, 172 La. 137, 133 So. 389 (1931).
20. Prior to the amendment of the statute in 1952, a cross-examiner
could ask a witness about prior arrests and indictments. This inquiry is
strictly forbidden by the present statute. See 3 WiGMORE § 980a and Comment,
19 LA. L. REv. 684 (1959).
21. State v. Odom, 273 So.2d 261, 264 (La. 1973). Defense counsel objected
to the state's inquiry into a prior misdemeanor conviction. The court held
that no reversible error was committed by the trial court in overruling
the objection, and further stated: "Neither do we find defense counsel's
interpretation that R.S. 15:495 pertains only to felony convictions and not
to misdemeanors to have any validity." The court referred to LA. R.S. 14:7
(1950), which defines crime as "that conduct which is defined as criminal
in this Code, or in other acts of the legislature or in the constitution of this
state." The court concluded that "[tihere is no limitation to crimes of felony
status." 273 So.2d at 264 n.2. See also State v. Dundas, 168 La. 95, 121 So. 586
(1929). However, "crime" does not include violations of municipal ordinances,
LA. R.S. 14:7 (1950), comment: "It is intended to exclude from the designa-
tion 'crime' all offenders [sic] denounced in municipal ordinances." Also, in
State v. Green, 273 So.2d 288 (La. 1973), the district attorney asked the
defendant, charged with murder, on cross-examination whether he had been
convicted of anything. After answering in the affirmative, he was asked of
what, to which he replied "misdemeanor theft." The trial court denied
the defense motion to have the jury instructed to disregard the cross-
examination. The supreme court held that the refusal was proper, stating
that R.S. 15:495 "clearly permits" cross-examination as to "any crime" for
the purposes of impeachment. 273 So.2d at 290.
22. State v. Rossi, 273 So.2d 265, 268 (La. 1973). Objection was made
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been held that a gubernatorial pardon of the conviction does not
prevent the inquiry, but the witness is entitled to rehabilitate
himself by explanation of the pardon in support of his credibil-
ity.28 An adjudication of juvenile delinquency is not a conviction
of crime in Louisiana,4 and thus may not be used to impeach. 25
The extent of the inquiry relative to the crime is limited to the
particular offense committed, the nature of the crime, and the
number of convictions. 26 A cross-examiner may not interrogate
the witness concerning the details of these prior offenses.2
Effect on the Defendant
When a defendant's past criminal record is placed before
the jury ostensibly to attack his credibility, it exposes him to
that the prior conviction of a defense witness was "very, very remote" and
that the trial court did not let the defendant Rossi explain his prior con-
victions to show that they did not bear upon his veracity. The court felt
that no error was committed in overruling the objection, holding that
"[t]he Louisiana jurisprudence does not now interpret this statute as limit-
ing such impeachment testimony to recent crimes, nor to crimes indicative
of the credibility of the witness or of the testifying defendant." Id.
23. State v. Boudreaux, 221 La. 1078, 61 So.2d 878 (1952); State v. Taylor,
72 La. 20, 133 So. 349 (1931); State v. Duplechain, 52 La. Ann. 448, 26 So.
1000 (1899). See also Note, 25 TUL. L. Rv. 281, 283 (1951), and Slovenko,
The Treatment of the Criminal in Louisiana d Elsewhere, 34 TUL. L. RMv.
523, 545 n.81 (1960).
24. LA. R.S. 13:1580 (1950): "No adjudication by the court upon the status
of any child shall operate to impose any of the civil disabilities ordinarily
resulting from conviction, nor shall any child be deemed a criminal by
reason of such adjudication on, nor shall such adjudication be deemed a
conviction." (Emphasis added.)
25. State v. Kelly, 169 La. 753, 126 So. 49 (1930).
26. State v. Green, 273 So.2d 288 (La. 1973) (allowed the state to ask de-
fendant if he was convicted of anything, and if so, what); State v. Keen, 215
La. 577, 41 So.2d 223 (1949) (allowed inquiry as to nature of indictment;
though it must be noted that this case was decided before the 1952 amend-
ment to R.S. 15:495 that prohibited inquiry into prior indictments); State v.
Quinn, 131 La. 490, 59 So. 913 (1912) (allowed questioning as to the nature
of the crime and the number of times convicted).
27. State v. Kelly, 271 So.2d 870 (La. 1973): "La. R.S. 15:495 allows the
introduction of evidence as to prior convictions for the purpose of im-
peaching the credibility of a witness. This court has held, that, in so doing,
only the fact of conviction is admissible and not the details of the prior
offenses." State v. Brent, 248 La. 1072, 184 So.2d 14 (1966); State v. Perkins,
248 La. 293, 178 So.2d 255 (1965); State v. Danna, 170 La. 755, 129 So. 154
(1930); see The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1965-1966
Term-Evidence, 27 LA. L. Rsv. 551, 552-56 (1967). But see State v. Clark, 117
La. 920, 42 So. 425 (1906), where the court found no error in the trial court's
overruling objections to cross-examination regarding the nature of convic-
tion, the name under which defendant was convicted, and why he used that
name.
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a grave danger of prejudice.28 In order to properly affect verac-
ity, the jury must be willing to infer from the fact of the past
convictions that the defendant is the kind of man who would
disregard the obligations of the oath and hence falsify testi-
mony on the stand.29 Although the defendant is entitled to an
instruction that the prior conviction must be used only on the
question of credibility and not on the question of guilt or
innocence s the jury might well disregard the instruction3 ' and
28. Ladd, Credibility Tests-Current Trends, 89 U. PA. L. Rav. 166, 168
(1940): "The effect of showing a previous conviction of crime is so strong
in either creating prejudice in the minds of the jury or causing them to
believe that the accused has a propensity to do evil that the desirability
of the use of this type of evidence for impeachment purposes when the
accused is a witness is very doubtful." Note, 19 HASTNGS L.J. 919, 922 (1968):
"When the witness is the accused testifying in his own behalf the weakness
of this [prior convictions] evidence may be fatal to its value, because a
veritable amount of prejudice is then imposed against it."
29. The theory of the use of previous convictions to test credibility was
stated by former Justice Holmes in an oft-cited decision, Gertz iv. Firchburg
Ry. Co., 137 Mass. 77, 78 (1884): "[Wlhen it is proved that a witness has
been convicted of a crime, the only ground for disbelieving him which such
proof affords is the general readiness to do evil which the conviction may
be supposed to show. It is from that general disposition alone that the
jury is asked to infer a readiness to lie in the particular case, and thence
that he has lied in fact. The evidence has no tendency to prove that he
was mistaken, but only that he has perjured himself, and it reaches that
conclusion solely through the general proposition that he is of bad character
and unworthy of credit."
30. State v. Rocco, 222 La. 177, 183 n.3, 62 So.2d 265, 267 n.3 (1952):
"[Wihere impeaching evidence is received, it becomes the duty of the judge
to caution the jury that such evidence should not be considered as proof of
defendant's guilt." (This case involved the use of a prior inconsistent state-
ment.) In State v. Lamison, 220 La. 878, 885-86, 57 So.2d 755, 757 (1952), the
following charge was held to have "adequately instructed the jury" with
regard to prior conviction evidence to impeach: "'If you find from the
evidence that the defendant, before the crime for which he is now on trial,
had been convicted of other crimes ... and if you also find from the evi-
dence . .. these previous crimes and offenses had no connection with the
charge in the indictment for which he is now on trial, then I charge you
that you are not to consider his having been . . . convicted of the said
previous offenses as proof of his guilt of this charge, but you are to consider
such previous ... convictions only in deciding the weight you are to give
to his testimony as a witness.'" However, in State v. Green, 244 La. 80, 105,
150 So.2d 571, 580 (1963), the following sentence in the charge was held
improper: "[I]t is the law of Louisiana that the proof of a prior conviction
of a felony is valid impeachment of that witness." The court held: "This
is not a correct statement of the law, as proof of a felony does not of itself
Impeach the witness. The law is that evidence of conviction of a crime
is admissible for the purpose of impeaching the credibility of the witness...
and it is for the jury to decide whether it believes the witness." Id. See also
1 C. BLACKMAR & E. Dsvrr'r, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE & INSTRUCTIONS §§ 12.01-.07
(1970); Manual on Jury Instrution in Federal Crim4nal Cases § 6.06-2, in 33
F.R.D. 525, 575 (1964).
31. It has been argued that this limiting instruction is ineffective. Glick,
Impeachment by Prior Convictions: A Critique of Rule 6-09 of the Proposed
Rules of Evidence for U.S. District Courts, 6 C0IM. L. BULL. 330, 333 (1970):
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accept this evidence prejudicially. The jury's exposure to the
defendant's past convictions can be prejudicial in two respects: 3 2
the jury may automatically conclude that the accused is an
incorrigible who, though not guilty of the crime charged, should
be punished because of his past crimes; and, because the defen-
dant has committed other crimes, he probably committed the
crime charged. Because of this strong likelihood of prejudice,
there have been three areas of constitutional attack on the use
of prior convictions as impeaching evidence: 83 (1) It may operate
to keep the defendant from testifying, thus effectively "chilling"
his right to testify. Rather than expose his "sordid past" to the
jury, he may well decide not to exercise his right to testify.8 4
(2) It could so prejudice the jury against him that, in effect, he
is denied his due process right of trial by an impartial jury.85
(3) It arguably may deny the defendant equal protection of law,
"[Flew would believe that when a jury is informed of a person's past crimes,
they can departmentalize their minds and consider it solely for impeach-
ment purposes and not as proof of his likelihood to commit the present
offense. Instructions to the jury to consider prior offenses only for impeach-
ment purposes are patently inadequate and have been properly described
as, 'a ritualistic counsel of psychologically Impossible behavior.'" See also
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723
(1963); McGowan, Impeachment of Criminal Defendants by Prior Convictions,
1970 LAW & SOCIAL ORDER 1, 9 n.33 (1970); Comment, 51 MINN. L. REV. 264
(1966).
32. Cohen, Impeachment of a Defendant-Witness by Prior Conviction,
6 CRIM. L. BULL 26, 33 (1970). In a recent scientific study of the American
jury system, it was reported that jurors who learned of past convictions
through impeachment convicted more often than those who did not, where
the charge and the evidence were similar. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE
AMERICAN JURY (1966). See also Comment, 70 YALE L.J. 763 (1961); Comment,
19 HAsnNs L.J. 919, 922 (1968).
33. See generally Comment, 36 Mo. L. REV. 472, 488 (1971); Comment, 37
U. CIN. L. REV. 168 (1968).
34. "While no specific provision in terms confers constitutional status
on the right of an accused to take the stand in his own defense, the existence
of the right is so completely recognized that a denial of it would surely be
of due process dimensions." Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence rule 608,
Advisory Committee note, at 82 (1971). Comment, 70 YALE L.J. 763, 776 (1961)
states: "In practice, the possibility of 'opening the door' to prejudicial other
crimes evidence discourages many defendants from taking the stand. The
impeachment doctrine thus effects an anomalous distinction between defen-
dants with and those without a criminal record in the exercise of the
right to testify In their own behalf." The Hawaii supreme court declared
unconstitutional the use of prior convictions to impeach because, inter alia,
it unreasonably burdens the defendant's right to testify in his own defense.
State v. Santiago, 492 P.2d 657 (Hawaii 1971). See note 10 supra.
35. Cohen, Impeachment of a Defendant-Witness by Prior Conviction, 6
CRIM. L. BULL. 26, 38 (1970): "It would seem that the Constitution requires
the juror to remain In a mental state so that no matter what a man had
done in the past there would be a fair opportunity to prove his Innocence."
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for an invidious discrimination is said to exist between the
defendant with a prior record and one who has none.3 6
Of course, the risk of undue prejudice to the accused would
be reduced if cross-examination to impeach were limited to those
crimes which bear a direct relation to impairment of the truth-
telling capacity.3 7 Where the prior conviction relates directly
to falsification and untruthfulness, the jury may more reliably
infer false testimony on the stand. This approach has been urged
by commentators and is the rule in several jurisdictions.3 8 In
Louisiana, though any conviction may be the subject of cross-
examination to impeach,3 9 a recent concurring opinion by Justice
Barham in State v. Odom has advocated the more limited view:
"In the proper case we should exclude the introduction of other
convictions for the purpose of impeachment and as an attack
upon credibility unless the convictions are offenses which, by
their very nature, charge perjury, falsification, or lack of truth-
fulness." 4
86. Id. at 87: "Invidious discrimination is said to exist between the
defendant with a prior record and one who has none. However, there is no
invidious discrimination when there is a reasonable basis upon which the
distinct classifications are made .... Where . . . there is at least a logical
possibility of nexus between the prior crimes of dishonesty and the defen-
dant's testimony, the invidious discrimination argument will be to no avail."
37. It has been suggested that there is no justification for the use of
all crimes to impeach. Ladd, Credibility Tests--Current Trends, 89 U. PA.
I. REv. 166,, 178 (1940): "There should be . . . a rationalization of the kind
of crimes which may be used to test credibility. There is no justification
for the use of crimes in omnibus. Many crimes give no light on the
credibility of the offender. Murder is both an infamous crime and a felony
and yet it may have no bearing upon veracity." The article then suggests
the type of crimes that should be used: "The group of offenses including
forgery, uttering forged instruments, bribery, suppression of evidence,
false pretenses, cheating, embezzlement, roughly discloses a type of dis-
honesty and unreliability characteristic of those lacking veracity. Not only
would witnesses with such records tend to be conscience free in giving
false testimony, but these crimes . . . might indicate the propensity to
gain by false means and thus to falsify." Id. at 180. See also 19 HASTINGS
L.J. 919, 922 (1968).
38. Shaefer, Police Interrogation & the Privilege Against Self-Incrim-
ination, 61 N.W.U.L. Rov. 506, 512 (1966): "When the accused takes the
stand in his own behalf, he should . . . be subject to impeachment only
by proof of past crimes which directly bear on testimonial deception,
such as perjury. Past convictions not in this category should be inadmis-
sible unless they are relevant for some purpose other than impeachment.
... The contrary and current practice lies close to the borders of the
due process clause, and it should be eliminated." This approach is also
proposed by the UNIFORm RULE OF EVIDENCE 21 (1953) and MODEL CODE OF
EVIDENcE rule 106 (1942). For a discussion of the proposition that even
veracity-related convictions should not be admitted, see Comment, 70 YALE
L.J. 763, 778 (1961). See note 7 supra.
39. See note 22 supra.
40. State v. Odom, 273 So.2d 261, 265 (La. 1973) (concurring opinion).
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Other Acts of Misconduct
Jurisdictions Other than Louisiana
Inquiry into prior misconduct other than convictions has
been governed by a variety of rules in the state courts. 41 Several
states have adopted statutes which do not allow such ques-
tioning.42 Even without the presence of a statute, a significant
number of jurisdictions have prohibited the inquiry." Of the
remaining states, the overwhelming majority subject this type
of cross-examination to a discretionary control by the trial
judge." Some have limited the inquiry to those acts which bear
41. See generally MCCORMICK § 42; 8 WIOMORE §§ 982, 987. See also Hale,
Spectfic Acts & Related'Matters as Affecting Credibility, 1 HASTINGS L.J. 89
(1950); Slough, Impeachment of Witnesses: Common Law Principles &
Modern Trends, 34 IND. LJ. 1 (1958); Slough, Other Vices, Other Crimes,
41 IOWA L. RIEv. 325 (1956); Udall, Character Proof it the Law of Evidence-
A Summary, 18 U. CIN. L. REV. 283 (1949); Comment, 14 BAYLOR L. REV. 59,
66 (1962).
42. Such statutes include: CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 787 (West 1966): "Sub-
Ject to § 788 [which allows cross-examination as to prior felony conviction
to attack credibility], evidence of specific instances of his conduct relevant
only to prove a trait of his character is inadmissible to attack or sup-
port the credibility of a witness." IDAHO GEN. LAWS § 9-1209 (1948): "A
witness may be impeached by the party against whom he was called, by
contradicting evidence that his general reputation for truth, honesty or
integrity is bad, but not by evidence of particular wrongful acts, except
that it may be shown by examination of the witness, or the record of
the judgment, that he had been convicted of a felony." This exact lan-
guage is also found in MONT. REV. CODES § 93-1901-11 (1964). OREGON REV.
STAT. § 45.600 (1969): "A witness may be impeached by the party against
whom he was called, by contradictory evidence or by evidence that his
general reputation for truth is bad or that his moral character is such as
to render him unworthy of belief; but he may not be impeached by evi-
dence of particular wrongful acts, except that it may be shown by his
examination or by the record of judgment, that he has been convicted of a
crime."
43. People v. Pilgrim, 160 Cal. App. 2d 528, 325 P.2d 143 (1958); Shrop-
shire v. State, 279 N.E.2d 225 (Ind. 1972); Williams v. State, 15 Md. Sp. App.
320, 290 A.2d 542 (1972); People v. Robinson, 386 Mich. 551, 194 N.W.2d 709
(1972); Webber v. State, 472 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971). This
approach is taken in UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 22 (1953): "As affecting
the credibility of a witness . . . (d) evidence of specific instances of his
conduct relevant only as tending to prove a trait of his character, shall be
inadmissible."
44. Slough, Impeachment of Witnesses: Common Law Principles d
Modern Trends, 34 IND. L.J. 1, 20 (1958): "In the majority of American
jurisdictions, the extent of [cross-] examination In this regard will be deter-
mined by the trial judge." See People v. Smith, 63 Cal. 2d 779, 409 P.2d 222, 46
Cal. Rptr. 382 (1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 913 (1967); State v. Stout, 83
N.M. 624, 495 P.2d 802 (1972); People v. Sorge, 301 N.Y. 198, 93 N.E.2d 637
(1950); State v. Neal, 222 N.C. 546, 23 S.E.2d 911 (1943); Dungan v. State,
135 Wis. 151, 115 N.W. 350 (1908).
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directly upon the witness' truth and veracity,45 while others
allow broad cross-examination concerning any prior miscon-
duct.4 6 All courts agree, however, if the witness denies the
alleged misconduct, the cross-examiner must "take his answer,"
and is not allowed to prove discrediting acts extrinsically.47
Most of the federal courts of appeals have prohibited cross-
examination concerning past acts of misconduct of a witness
to impeach ;48 but there is some authority for allowing the inquiry
if the misconduct involved relates directly to veracity.49 This
45. State v. Goldberger, 118 Conn. 444, 173 A. 216 (1934); State v.
Schutte, 97 Conn. 444, 117 A. 508 (1922); Nelson v. State, 99 Fla. 1032, 128
So. 1 (1930); State v. Knox, 98 S.C. 114, 82 S.E. 278 (1914); State v. Hougen-
sen, 91 Utah 351, 64 P.2d 229 (1936).
46. Heath v. State, 249 Ark. 217, 459 S.W.2d 420 (1970); Weeks v. State,
241 So.2d 203 (Fla. App. 1970); People v. Kass, 25 N.Y.2d 123, 250 N.E.2d
219, 302 N.Y.S.2d 807 (1969); State v. Halth, 7 N.C. App. 552, 172 S.E.2d 912
(1970); Wilson v. State, 452 S.W.2d 355 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969); State v.
Goddard, 56 Wash. 2d 33, 351 P.2d 159 (1960). See Heilbron, Cross-examina-
tton & Impeachment, 15 ARK. L. REv. 39 (1960); Paine, Impeachment of
Witnesses in Tennessee, 36 TENN. L. Rmv. 728 (1969). The military courts
allow cross-examination of all witnesses except the accused concerning
prior acts of misconduct for credibility purposes. MANUAL FOa COURTS-
MARITAL, UNITED STATES 149 b(1) (rev. ed. 1969) provides: "On the question
of his credibility and within the limits imposed by the privilege against
self-incrimination, a witness may be cross-examined as to any matter
touching upon his worthiness of belief. For instance, unless a military
judge . . .determines as a matter of discretion that the particular subject
of inquiry would be so remote with respect to the credibility of the witness
as to be irrelevant, a witness may be cross-examined as to his ...acts of
misconduct . ...
1 153b(2)(b) further provides: "It is permissible on cross-examination of
any witness other than the accused to adduce, for the purpose of im-
peaching the witness, evidence that he has committed an offense involv-
ing moral turpitude or otherwise affecting his credibility, even if that
evidence does not amount to proof of conviction of the offense and even
if the witness has not in fact been convicted of the offense." See Amery,
Impeachment of Witnesses by EvIdence of Prior Misconduct, 10 USAF JAG
L. Rgv. No. 4, at 16 (1968).
47. Wells v. State, 239 Ind. 415, 158 N.E.2d 256 (1959); Martinez v. Avila,
76 N.M. 372, 415 P.2d 59 (1966); MCCORMICK § 42, at 84: "[Pjroof is limited
to what can be brought out on cross-examination. Thus, if the witness
stands his ground and denies the alleged misconduct, the examiner must
'take his answer,' not that he may not further cross-examine to extract
an admission, but in the sense that he may call other witnesses to prove
the discrediting acts."
48. United States v. Fox, 473 F.2d 131 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v.
Davenport, 449 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Rudolph, 403 F.2d
805 (6th Cir. 1968); United States v. Normand, 402 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 938 (1970); Tafoya v. United States, 386 F.2d 537,
(10th Cir. 1967); United States v. Provoo, 215 F.2d 531 (2d Cir. 1954), noted
in 1955 WASH. U.L.Q. 209 (1955). See also Orfleld, Impeachment & Support
of Witnesses in Federal Criminal Cases, 11 U. KAN. L. REv. 447, 460-64 (1963).
49. United States v. Varelli, 407 F.2d 735 (7th Cir. 1969); United States
v. Stirone, 168 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Penn. 1957), aff'd, 262 F.2d 571 (3d Cir.
1958), rev'd on other grounds, 361 U.S. 212 (1959).
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latter approach, though not the prevailing view in the federal
courts, is found in rule 608(b) of the Proposed Federal Rules
of Evidence. If adopted, the rule would provide that specific
instances of conduct of a witness may be inquired into on cross-
examination of the witness himself for the purposes of attacking
or supporting his credibility, provided the conduct be "probative
of truthfulness or untruthfulness and not remote in time."
Louisiana
Louisiana statutory law makes no provision for cross-exam-
ination to impeach as to past criminal acts where no conviction
has been obtained. Early Louisiana cases seemed to indicate that
no witness, defendant or otherwise, might be impeached by
using prior acts of misconduct for which no conviction had been
obtained. The court assigned as reasons for the exclusion either
that the inquiry was unduly prejudicial to the rights of the
defendant,5° or that the questioning was irrelevant and imma-
terial.51 A recent case seems to imply, however, that a witness
50. In State v. Allemand, 153 La. 741, 747, 96 So. 552, 554 (1923), one of
the defendants, charged with murder, was asked on cross-examination:
"Then on . . . the night [the victim] was shot, you did run a public ball
without a license?" In the lower court objection was made that the pur-
pose of the question Was to prejudice the jurors by showing that the
defendants were violators of the law In other respects. The objection was
overruled by the trial court because the question could be "'asked for the
purpose of testing his memory, his credibility, or otherwise.'" The supreme
court reversed, holding: "We are convinced therefore that, under the cir-
cumstances of this case, it could have had but one purpose and effect, and
that was to prejudice the jury against the accused, and should not have
been permitted." Id. at 748, 96 So. at 555. Later, in State v. Frazier, 165 La.
758, 761, 116 So. 176, 177 (1928), defendant, charged with murder, was
asked on cross-examination: "Are you the same [N]egro that a crowd had
and was going to whip and the sheriff took you away from them?" The
trial court sustained objection to the questioning but refused to give a
special limiting instruction. The supreme court held not only that the
questioning was improper, but also that an instruction to the jury was
essential in order to avoid the prejudicial effect on the jury. In reversing
the conviction, the court stated: "The questions themselves were objec-
tionable, not only because of their tendency to invoke race prejudice, but
because they had reference to three supposed previous troubles on the part
of the defendant, which had no connection whatever with the crime for
which he was on trial, and which were brought out by implication merely
for the purpose of showing that the defendant was a man of bad char-
acter .... " Id. at 762, 116 So. at 177.
51. In State v. LeBleu, 137 La. 1007, 69 So. 808 (1915), defendants were
convicted of stealing cows. One of the victims was asked on cross-examina-
tion whether the cattle in question had been assessed. The supreme court
upheld the lower court's sustaining an objection to the question as being
immaterial and irrelevant, stating that: "'[Tihe purpose of the question
was to test the credibility of the witness. The credibility of the witness can-
not be impeached by particular acts, Irrelevant to the issue and sought to
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other than the accused may be interrogated about his own crim-
inal acts within the discretion of the trial court.52
State v. Perkins" apparently made clear that cross-exam-
ination of the defendant concerning past criminal acts is limited
solely to past convictions. In Perkins, the defendant, charged
with negligent homicide, was asked on cross-examination, "This
is not the first stop sign you have ever run, is it, Mrs. Perkins? '54
The court held the inquiry to be improper because "[a]s phrased
the question had no reference to prior convictions. Instead, it
inquired of specific traffic misconduct on other occasions."55 And,
in reference to R.S. 15:495, the court held:
"The statute is explicit that, in this type of impeachment,
only evidence of convictions is admissible to attack the
be brought out on cross-examination for the purpose of impeaching him.'"
Id. at 1014, 69 So. at 810. In State v. Morgan, 147 La. 205, 226, 84 So. 589, 596
(1920), a defense witness was asked on cross-examination: "Isn't it true
that you ran off with another man's wife . . . and took her to New York
and lived with her there?" The supreme court affirmed the trial court's
sustaining the objection to the question as "impertinent, impudent, and
irrelevant." The court concluded: "The district attorney should not have
asked the witness . . . a question which was not material to the issues of
the case." Id. at 226, 84 So. at 597. In State v. Danna, 170 La. 755, 129 So. 154
(1930), defendants were charged with cutting with intent to murder. A pros-
ecution witness was asked on cross-examination: "How many fights have
you had before this?" The supreme court upheld the sustaining of the
objection, stating: "The number of fights which the witness . . . may have
had with other persons prior to the prosecution in this, was . . . immaterial
and irrelevant." Id. at 757, 129 So. at 154. Later, in State v. DiVincenti, 225
La. 689, 704, 73 So.2d 806, 811 (1954), defendant was charged with simple
burglary. A prosecution witness was asked on cross-examination: "How
many times were you in the hole [solitary confinement] while you were
held in the parish prison?" The ruling of the trial court sustaining the
objection on the ground of immateriality was upheld by the supreme court.
52. In State v. Davis, 259 La. 35, 249 So.2d 193 (1971), defendant was
charged with manslaughter resulting from a scuffle with one Reverend
Dyer. On cross-examination, Dyer was asked whether he had ever been
identified as an active participant in militant civil rights groups, and also
whether he had ever been involved in an act of physical violence with his
wife. The trial court sustained objections to the questions as being neither
germane nor relevant. The supreme court upheld the exclusion, stating,
"While cross-examination is afforded a broad scope . . . nevertheless, the
trial judge is vested with a sound discretion to stop irrelevant examination
... . Further, the discretion of the trial court in determining a question
of relevancy should not be disturbed in the absence of clear abuse." Id. at
44, 249 So.2d at 196. See also State v. LeBleu, 137 La. 1007, 69 So. 808 (1915);
State v. High, 116 La. 79, 86, 40 So. 538, 540 (1906): "The rule is that a large
discretion is left to the trial judge in the matter of how far a witness may
on cross-examination be questioned as to irrelevant matters for the pur-
pose of affecting his credibility; and that this discretion will not be inter-
fered with unless abused."
53. 248 La. 293, 178 So.2d 255 (1965).
54. Id. at 297, 178 So.2d at 256.
55. Id.
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credibility of the defendant. The defendant can only be ques-
tioned as to such prior convictions. He cannot be asked about
specific misconduct or the details of prior offenses. (Emphasis
added.) "5
The approach of the Perkins decision has been generally followed
in subsequent cases. In State v. Gray,57 defendant, charged with
attempted murder, was asked on cross-examination whether he
had previously threatened and raped one of the state's witnesses
subsequent to the attempted murder. The court found the ques-
tioning improper and reversed the conviction, stating that "[f] or
the purpose of impeachment, the commission of other offenses
is strictly limited by the provisions of R.S. 15:495. ' '15 Later in
State v. Kelly,59 defendant, charged with armed robbery, was
asked on cross-examination, "Did you ever stick anybody with
a knife?"' 0 The court recognized that the question was improper
under the Perkins decision because it did not refer to any
conviction. However, a bill of exceptions was not properly taken
to the form of the question at the time it was made, and the
objection was considered waived.
More recently, in State v. Prieur,'1 defendant was charged
with armed robbery. During cross-examination, he was asked:
"'You got them [30 $1.00 bills found on defendant at the
time of his arrest] from other robberies?' and 'Who did you
tell the police you stole that car from?' . .. 'Are you familiar
with the two bus holdups on Tchoupitoulas and Louisiana?'
. . . 'They charged you with seven robberies?' "82
Citing Perkins, the supreme court reversed the conviction be-
cause the crimes brought out on cross-examination did not refer
to convictions, but rather to offenses for which the defendant
had not been convicted. "A limitation is placed on the State,
." the court held, "insofar as it may use evidence of other
crimes. Only evidence of conviction of a crime is admissible,
not arrests, indictments, or prosecutions."
56. Id. at 298, 178 So. at 257.
57. 262 La. 53, 262 So.2d 367 (1972).
58. Id. at 57, 262 So.2d at 369.
59. 262 La. 143, 262 So.2d 501 (1972).
60. Id. at 146, 262 So.2d at 502.
61. 277 So.2d 134 (La. 1973).
62. Id. at 135-36.
63. Id. at 136.
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Although a recent decision, State v. Morris,4 casts doubt
upon the Perkins line of cases, it is believed that, properly under-
stood, it purports no basic change. Defendant was charged with
armed robbery. Police authorities testified regarding inculpatory
statements made by defendant during interrogation, including
a reference to a pawn ticket found in defendant's possession as
representing a watch taken in a prior robbery. The court's per
curiam decision stated that the "questioning was within the per-
missible scope of cross-examination" and that it "was not error
for the State to attempt to impeach the defendant regarding
the circumstances surrounding the pawn ticket."65 The court
reasoned that since it had been referred to in the confession,
and since a confession must be used in its entirety," then evi-
dence of the prior crime was admissible. It seems that this case
does not reflect a rejection by the court of the Perkins rationale.
Rather, Morris refers to cross-examination of a defendant about
prior criminal acts referred to in a confession previously held to
be properly admissible. 67
64. 261 La. 1069, 262 So.2d 324 (1972). See the discussion of Morris in
The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1971-1972 Term-Ev4-
denee, 33 LA. L. REv. 306, 309-10 (1973).
65. State v. Morris, 261 La. 1069, 1072-73, 262 So.2d 324, 325 (1972).
66. LA. R.S. 15:450 (1950).
67. Two other recent decisions seem to indicate that prior acts of mis-
conduct which are not convictions can be used to impeach. However, it is
submitted that on a proper interpretation, these cases do not indicate that
the Perkins rule has been rejected by the court. In State v. Dotson, 260
La. 471, 256 So.2d 594 (1971), defendant, charged with the possession of
narcotics, was asked on cross-examination whether he had used marijuana
on previous occasions. After the defendant's persistent denial, the state
was permitted by cross-examination of a defense witness, a police officer,
to bring out testimony which the supreme court viewed as implying that
the defendant had previously used marijuana. On rehearing, the court held
that the admission of the officer's testimony was not reversible error. The
court reasoned that, although the prior conduct was criminal, it had an
independent relevance to show guilty knowledge under R.S. 15:445 and 446.
"On the Issue of guilty knowledge or intent, the defendant denied prior
use of marijuana. Hence, the State had the right to contradict this testi-
mony." 260 La. at 519, 256 So.2d at 611. Despite the fact that the district
attorney had referred to the testimony as impeaching, the court ruled: "The
term impeaching is a misnomer. Technically, the testimony should be
designated as rebutting or contradicting. . . . The evidence of prior use of
marijuana was properly admitted to rebut or contradict the defendant's
testimony on an essential issue." Id. at 519-20, 256 So.2d at 611. Although
there may well be doubt as to whether the prosecution's questioning of
the defendant about the prior use of marijuana properly fits within the
knowledge-intent-system exception to the past crimes exclusionary rule, it
is important for the purposes of this Comment to note that the supreme
court treated the question as a "knowledge-intent-system" problem, rather
than an impeachment matter. Further, it should be emphasized that the
defendant made no objection to the Initial questioning. Thus, the holding
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Conclusion
It is submitted that in Louisiana, pursuant to the Perkins
rule, a defendant may not be cross-examined as to his prior acts
of misconduct for the purposes of impeachment. Cross-examina-
tion in this regard is limited solely to prior convictions, and is
governed by R.S. 15:495 and the rules discussed heretofore in
this Comment. Cross-examination as to prior acts of misconduct
not for impeachment purposes, but to prove the crime charged,
are regulated by the rules discussed in the companion article
to this Comment15
W. Michael Adams
THE UNIFORM ACT ON BLOOD TESTS:
DISAVOWAL AND DIVORCE
The Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity'
in Dotson is based upon the admissibility of the rebuttal testimony, not
upon the propriety of the questioning of the defendant on cross-examina-
tion.
Later, In State v. St. Amand, 274 So.2d 179 (La. 1973), defendant,
charged with armed robbery, was asked on cross-examination whether or
not he used narcotics. After his denial, the prosecution was permitted to
show that he had stated to the contrary on a prior occasion. A majority
of the court found that the initial questioning was proper because the
state during its case in chief had produced evidence of narcotic parapher-
nalia found in St. Amand's apartment at the time of his arrest. The court
rejected the defendant's contention that the state was attempting to im-
peach the defendant on an irrelevant matter because "the evidence of
narcotic paraphernalia found In St. Amand's apartment made the ques-
tioning within the scope of that subject." Id. at 192. The court held that
the initial inquiry into defendant's prior narcotics addiction was permissible
because "lilt is almost axiomatic today that most armed robberies are asso-
ciated with drug addicts trying to obtain funds to sustain their grim appe-
tites. In armed robbery prosecutions, therefore, the subject of drug use by
the accused is relevant." Id. Since the prior drug use of the defendant was
deemed to be relevant and non-collateral, the court reasoned that he could
be "impeached" on the matter.
Again, properly understood, this case appears to involve the application
of the knowledge-intent-system exception to the prior crimes exclusionary
rule in the court's determination of whether the narcotic paraphernalia
found in defendant's room and brought out by the state in its case in chief,
justified questioning the defendant on cross-examination about prior drug
use. Thus, the decision should not be interpreted as standing for the prop-
osition that it is proper impeachment to ask a defendant about prior use of
narcotics.
68. 33 LA. L. REV. 614 (1973).
1. The Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity [hereinafter
cited as UNIFORm ACT] states in part:
"Section 1. Authority for Test. In a civil action, in which paternity
is a relevant fact, the court, upon its own initiative or upon suggestion
made by or on behalf of any person whose blood is involved may, or
upon motion of any party to the action made at a time so as not to delay
the proceedings unduly, shall order the mother, child and alleged father
